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Kickbacks, Honest Services, and Health Care Fraud
After Skilling
Joan H Krause·
This essay considers how the 2010 Supreme Court decision in Skilling v.
United States', which limited the situations in which mail and wire fraud
cases may be premised on violations of the "intangible right to honest
services," has the potential to alter the future of health care fraud
enforcement. To be clear, Skilling was not a healthcare case. Rather, the
litigation stemmed from the investigation of Enron's former CEO, Jeffrey
Skilling, who was accused of engaging in a conspiracy to commit honest
services wire fraud as well as multiple forms of securities-related fraud. In
rejecting a vagueness challenge to the honest services theory, however, the
Court read the statute in a very narrow way that puts kickbacks and bribery
cases squarely in the crosshairs, an approach that may have serious
implications for healthcare fraud.
To understand the significance of Skilling, it is necessary to appreciate
the context in which healthcare fraud cases arise under current law. To that
end, this essay begins by providing a brief overview of current health care
fraud enforcement and of the Medicare & Medicaid Anti-Kickback Statute,2
one of the main tools used to combat health care fraud and the law most
likely to be affected by Skilling. After a brief introduction to the mail and
wire fraud statutes, the essay turns to the implications of the Skilling
decision for honest services in health care. I conclude that while Skilling is
perceived to have narrowed the scope of the honest services doctrine
overall, it may have the somewhat counterintuitive effect of encouraging
the government to bring additional healthcare honest services prosecutions.

I.

HEALTHCARE FRAUD IN CONTEXT

Recent years have seen many revisions to the health care anti-fraud laws,
• Dan K. Moore Distinguished Professor of Law, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill
School of Law; Secondary Appointment, Department of Social Medicine, University of
North Carolina School of Medicine; Adjunct Professor of Health Policy and Management,
Gillings School of Global Public Health. This essay is based on Joan H. Krause, Skilling
and the Pursuit ofHealth Care Fraud, U. MIAMI L. REV. (forthcoming 2011).
1. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2926 (2010).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2011).
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an escalation in anti-fraud rhetoric from the Executive and Congressional
branches, and a host of stories in the popular media from sources such as 60
3
Minutes. Lest we think healthcare fraud is a new phenomenon, however,
we should remember that in the mid-1990's, then-Attorney General Janet
Reno designated healthcare fraud as the "number two" priority of the
Department of Justice ("DOJ"), second only to violent crime. 4 While antiterrorism concerns have of course been paramount since September 11,
health care fraud remains a key element of the DOJ's post-Enron focus on
corporate wrongdoing.
The main reason the federal government is concerned about health care
fraud is the amount of federal money at stake, most notably through the
Medicare and Medicaid programs. A major problem, however, is the
uncertainty regarding how much money truly is at risk. While the claim
often is made that up to ten percent of healthcare expenditures may be
fraudulent (a total of somewhere between $60 and $100 billion dollars a
year), these numbers really have no solid empirical basis. The sad truth is
that we do not know for sure how much money we lose to healthcare fraud,
in large part because if a scheme is successful, we may never even know it
exists.
Since the mid-1990's, concern over the incidence of health care fraud has
led Congress to appropriate more funds to the federal agencies with
jurisdiction over the industry, including the DOJ and the Department of
Health and Human Services ("HHS") Office of the Inspector General
("OIG"). The framework for modem healthcare fraud enforcement derives
from the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
("HIP AA"), which defined new crimes applicable to those who defraud
public or private healthcare benefit programs; directed more funds to
federal investigatory and enforcement agencies; expanded the grounds for
and length of time that wrongdoers could be excluded from the federal
health care programs; and increased both the number of activities subject to
civil monetary penalties ("CMPs") and the penalty amounts. 5 HIPAA also
created the Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Program ("Control
Program") to coordinate federal, state, and local fraud enforcement efforts.
The Centerpiece of the Control Program is the Health Care Fraud and
Abuse Control Account ("Control Account"), which provides funding for
future HHS and DOJ anti-fraud efforts. In loose terms, the money
recovered through federal health care fraud enforcement is deposited into
3. See, e.g., 60 Minutes: The $60 Billion Fraud (CBS News broadcast Oct. 25, 2009),
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=5419844n.
4. See JANET RENO, 1994 ANN. REP. OF ATT'Y GEN. OF U.S. (1994),
http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/annualreports/ar94/finalag.txt.
5. Health Insurance Portability And Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
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the Medicare Trust Fund, but can be transferred to the Control Account
(within broad statutory limits) at the discretion of the Attorney General and
the Secretary of HHS. This approach has been expanded in nearly all
subsequent legislation related to the federal health care programs; indeed,
the recent Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 ("ACA")
contained no shortage of pro-enforcement provisions, ranging from
increased enforcement budgets to the expansion of CMPs and significant
amendments to the major civil and criminal anti-fraud laws. 6
These enforcement efforts have paid off, at least to a certain extent. The
federal government won or negotiated approximately $2.5 billion in
healthcare fraud judgments and settlements in fiscal year 2010.
Approximately $2.86 billion was returned to the Medicare Trust Fund, with
an additional $683.2 million returned to the Federal Treasury through
Medicaid anti-fraud efforts. 7 It is difficult to judge the effectiveness of antifraud efforts by focusing on recoveries in any single year, chiefly because
numbers can be skewed by big recoveries that are negotiated in one year but
not collected until subsequent years. Overall, however, more than $18
billion has been returned to the Medicare Trust Fund since the Control
Program began in 1997.
These recent efforts are perhaps best described as illustrating a "law
enforcement" approach to healthcare fraud prevention. Everyone wants to
be tough on fraud, and the easiest way to do that is to increase penalties,
enact new laws prohibiting ever more specific types of fraudulent activities,
and channel more money to federal investigators and prosecutors to use
these new laws - essentially the model created by HIPAA. Unfortunately,
it is not clear that increasing law enforcement, at least the way we have
been doing it, is particularly effective. In fact, there is a compelling
literature to suggest that the traditional law enforcement paradigm may be
precisely the wrong way to go about reducing health care fraud.
Our current health care reimbursement model often is referred to as "pay
and chase": the federal health care programs (and private insurers) pay
claims first, audit those claims months (or sometimes years) later, and only
then try to hunt down the wrongdoers and recover benefits wrongly paid
out. This is, to put it mildly, not a particularly efficient system. These
enforcement efforts are consistent with basic criminal deterrence theory,
which aims to deter unwanted behavior by ( 1) increasing the penalties for
those who are convicted, and (2) increasing the chances of perpetrators
being caught. In the context of a heavily regulated government program,

6. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148 (2010).
7. U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE (DOJ), HEALTH
CARE FRAUD & ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010 1 (Jan.
2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/pubdoc/hcfacreport2010.pdf.
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however, a third strategy bears consideration: decreasing the opportunities
for perpetrators to commit crimes in the first place. Strategies designed to
decrease billing ambiguities and loopholes and to increase oversight over
claims before they are paid may well have a more positive effect over the
long term, yet they have not been our focus thus far. 8
Fortunately, we have seen some recent movement in this direction,
including certain provisions in the ACA itself. But perhaps the best
example is the Health Care Fraud Prevention & Enforcement Action Team
("HEAT"), a joint 2009 HHS-DOJ initiative designed to proactively
investigate and identify healthcare fraud, in part by utilizing state-of-the-art
technology to analyze electronic claims data in near real-time to identify
questionable billing patterns. The future of anti-fraud efforts likely will be
focused much more closely on increased prepayment oversight and scrutiny
of providers before they submit bills. But to the extent these more mundane
tasks don't tend to make headlines the way that passing new anti-fraud laws
or increasing penalties might do, we likely will contend with the
prominence of the law enforcement paradigm for a long time to come. In
that context, Skilling may offer prosecutors an attractive tool.
II.

THE MEDICARE AND MEDICAID ANTI-KICKBACK STATUTE

The Medicare and Medicaid Anti-Kickback Statute ("AKS") is the main
federal fraud law applicable to financial relationships within the health care
market, including relationships between providers and their patients and
between healthcare manufacturers and their customers. At its core, the law
is designed to ensure that decisions about purchasing and ordering health
care items and services are not swayed by impermissible financial
influences. To accomplish that goal, the AKS prohibits the knowing and
willful offer, payment, solicitation, or receipt of any form of remuneration
designed to induce someone to refer patients or to purchase, lease, order, or
recommend any item or service for which payment may be made under a
federal health care program. 9 Federal health care programs include not only
Medicare and Medicaid, but also programs such as the Veterans
Administration.
Several aspects of the statute are notable. Both parties to a transaction
are vulnerable, although it is possible that only one will be found to have
the requisite intent. Prohibited remuneration broadly includes payments
made "directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind,"
extending beyond simple kickbacks and bribes to reach not only the

8. See, e.g., MALCOLM K. SPARROW, LICENSE TO STEAL: How FRAUD BLEEDS AMERICA'S
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 222-24, 243-45 (2000).

9.

42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2011).
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exchange of money, but really anything of value. ' 0 While remuneration
must be offered or paid "knowingly and willfully," neither actual
knowledge of the prohibition nor the specific intent to violate the statute is
required.
The penalties for violating the statute are severe, including both criminal
and civil/ administrative sanctions. A violation is a felony punishable by up
to five years in prison and a fine of up to $25,000. 11 Upon conviction, the
defendant is subject to the administrative remedy of exclusion from all
federal health care programs, a potentially fatal blow for entities that derive
substantial revenue from federal program business. Alternatively, OIG may
seek to impose permissive exclusion in lieu of criminal prosecution. The
government also has the authority to impose a CMP of $50,000 for each
violation, plus three times the amount of remuneration. Finally, AKS
allegations may be brought as Civil False Claims Act suits, both by federal
prosecutors and by private qui tam relators. 12 Administrative enforcement
of the statute is handled by OIG, while DOJ and the United States
Attorneys' Offices oversee criminal and civil litigation.
The AKS is well-known to attorneys who advise clients on health care
transactions, to the OIG personnel who offer guidance on how the law will
apply and enforce the law at the administrative level, and to federal
prosecutors who focus on healthcare fraud. But, at least historically, many
AKS allegations have been disposed of through civil or administrative
negotiations rather than through criminal prosecution. The Skilling opinion
has the potential to change that dynamic by strengthening the government's
motivation to pursue violations criminally - not as AKS prosecutions per
se, but rather through the mail and wire fraud statutes.
III.

MAIL AND WIRE FRAUD

The mail and wire fraud statutes are wonderfully versatile laws that
allow the federal government to prosecute crimes involving both public and
private fraud schemes. Both crimes require devising a scheme or artifice to
defraud or to obtain money or property by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses - a very broad reach that applies to fraud in both the public and
private sectors. For what is now almost solely jurisdictional purposes, mail
fraud requires the use of the mails in furtherance of the scheme (either the
United States mail or a private or commercial interstate carrier), while wire
fraud requires the interstate or foreign use of wire, radio, or television

10. Id. §1320a-7b(b)(l) & (2).
11. Id. § 1320a-7b.
12. 31 U.S.C. § 3729-30 (2011) (causes of action, including qui tam actions by private
persons).
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Mail and wire fraud cases fall into three general categories: those
involving a scheme to defraud a victim of (a) tangible property (in most
cases, money), (b) intangible property (such as information or intellectual
property) and, most importantly for our purposes, (c) the intangible right to
honest services. Prior to 1987, courts routinely interpreted the mail and
wire fraud statutes to encompass schemes to defraud victims of the "right to
honest and faithful services" by a public official or private employee - for
example, a bribe offered in connection with a state government contract. In
the 1987 case of McNally v. United States, however, the Supreme Court
held that the mail and wire fraud statutes did not reach frauds involving
intangible rights, but were instead limited to frauds involving money or
property. 14 In response, Congress quickly enacted 18 U.S.C. § 1346,
clarifying that the mail and wire fraud prohibitions indeed encompassed
schemes "to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services."
While the amendment generally is accepted to have returned the statute to
the pre-McNally state of the law, it remains controversial because it
includes no definitions to narrow this potentially expansive theory of
liability.
Against this background, Jeffrey Skilling challenged his conviction for
conspiracy to commit wire fraud via an honest services theory by arguing
that § 1346 was unconstitutionally vague. The Supreme Court, in an
opinion written by Justice Ginsburg, rejected Skilling's argument, holding
that § 1346 should be construed more narrowly. Looking to the history of
the pre-McNally case law, the majority determined "that § 1346
criminalizes only the bribe-and-kickback core of the pre-McNally case law,"
not "undisclosed self-dealing by a public officer or private employee ... to
further his own undisclosed financial interests" - the crime that Skilling
himself was accused of committing. 15 The Court upheld this narrow
construction of the statute, while remanding Skilling's case for further
proceedings.

IV.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF SKILLING FOR ANTI-KICKBACK CASES

While Skilling has no direct application to health law, it nonetheless
appears to open the door to more health care honest services prosecutions.
As a preliminary matter, we have to consider what types of intangible rights
might be implicated in health care. Two distinct categories of healthcare
relationships come to mind in which a physician may owe a duty to provide
honest services. First, a physician who violates either the law or a contract
13.
14.
15.

18 u.s.c. §§ 1341, 1343, 1346 (2011).
McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2931.
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term by giving or accepting kickbacks in connection with services covered
under insurance (including Medicare and Medicaid) might be viewed as
depriving the insurer of honest and faithful services. Second - and likely
more compelling - a physician who pays or accepts kickbacks in
connection with providing medical services might be said to deprive his or
her patients of honest and faithful services. Both theories tum on the idea,
which admittedly remains controversial, that a duty to provide honest
services arises by virtue of the physician's status as a fiduciary in these
contexts.
Perhaps surprisingly, there are few reported cases on this issue. Indeed,
the two most oft-cited cases, both dating back to the mid-1990's, reached
largely opposite conclusions. In the only appellate decision on point,
United States v. Jain, the government alleged that payments of $1,000 per
month by a psychiatric hospital to a psychologist for "marketing" services
were in reality payments made in return for his referral of patients to the
hospital. 16 Rejecting the allegations, the Eight Circuit found that the
government had failed to prove a scheme to defraud because there was no
evidence of any tangible harm to patients, nor any proof that Dr. Jain
intended to cause such harm. Instead, the evidence established that the
hospital provided quality psychiatric services and was as good (or better)
than the alternative facilities in the area, that all the patients required
hospitalization, and that there had been no financial harm to any patient. If
the client is not harmed because the alleged breach did not affect the
services that were rendered, the court asked, how can we say the right to
"honest services" has been violated? While prosecutors argued that § 1346
applied to unethical violations of a professional's fiduciary duty to provide
honest services, the court held that nondisclosure by a fiduciary must be
material in order to be actionable - and there was no evidence that the
patients would have considered the hospital's payments to be material
under these facts.
In contrast, a federal district court came to a different conclusion in
United States v. Neufeld. 17 Dr. Neufeld had entered into an alleged
"consulting" arrangement with Caremark, a home infusion company to
which he referred his Medicaid patients with AIDS. As in Jain, the
government claimed the payment really was compensation for his patient
referrals. In denying a motion to dismiss, the district court held that the
intangible rights theory required a fiduciary relationship, and no such
relationship existed between the doctor and the Medicaid program. There
was, however, evidence of a fiduciary relationship between the physician
and his patients.
16.
17.

U.S. v. Jain, 93 F.3d. 436 (8th Cir. 1996).
U.S. v. Neufeld, 908 F. Supp. 491 (S.D. Ohio 1995).
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[F]iduciary duty encompasses more than mere disclosure. If Dr. Neufeld
solicited bribes or remuneration in return for referring his patients to
Caremark, as it is alleged, then the health of his patients was certainly not
his only concern. His patients deserved medical opinions and referrals
18
unsullied by mixed motives.

The Court went on to note that the intangible rights theory, by definition,
implicates deception that goes beyond simply defrauding a victim of money
or property. Moreover, the court noted, the case did in fact involve a stream
of money flowing from Caremark to Dr. Neufeld. Citing long-standing
precedent, the Neufeld court noted that the money need not be received
from the victim in order to qualify as a violation of the doctrine.
It is not immediately apparent how to reconcile the Jain and Neufeld
opinions, beyond the basic recognition that the physician-patient
relationship may, at least in certain circumstances, be sufficient to qualify
as a fiduciary relationship under the honest services theory. Perhaps the
facts of Neufeld were more compelling, given that Caremark already had
pleaded guilty to nearly identical allegations of defrauding the federal
health care programs by paying physicians to refer patients to the
company. 19 Or perhaps the difference can be explained by the different
burdens required to survive Dr. Neufeld's motion to dismiss as compared to
that required to overturn Dr. Jain's conviction. Regardless, the dissonance
has made it difficult to assess the likely approach to be taken in future
healthcare honest services cases.
What is clear, however, is that to the extent the Skilling opinion functions
as an open invitation to bring honest services cases based on bribery and
kickbacks, we are likely to see more of these healthcare cases in the future.
Of course, from one perspective this may not matter. The government
already prosecutes mail and wire fraud cases involving healthcare kickback
schemes in which money or property has travelled through the mail or wires
(either for the kickback itself or for subsequent claims for services).
Skilling does not change this, and an additional honest services count might
be well be considered overkill in many of these cases.
Nonetheless, bringing AKS allegations as honest services mail and wire
fraud prosecutions may provide certain strategic advantages to the
government. When cases go to trial, it can be extremely compelling to
focus the jury on the physician-patient relationship as the locus of the
honest services breach: patients are far more sympathetic victims than
insurers and government agencies. Moreover, mail and wire fraud provide
a distinct advantage at the negotiation and plea bargaining stage: the
18. Id. at 500.
19. See Press Release, DOJ, Caremark to Pay $161 Million in Fraud and Kickback
Cases (June 16, 1995), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/Pre_96/June95/342. txt.html.
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statutory maximum penalty for AKS violations is five years in prison,
compared to twenty years for mail and wire fraud. 2 Finally,§ 1346 applies
not only to mail and wire fraud but also to the rest of 18 U.S.C. chapter 63,
which includes the HIP AA Health Care Fraud crime prohibiting a scheme
or artifice to defraud any healthcare benefit program.2 1 The penalties are ten
years in prison generally, twenty years if a violation results in serious
bodily injury, and up to life imprisonment if the violation results in death.
While few (if any) health care fraud cases so far appear to be based on a
kickback-related honest services theory, Skilling invites additional
prosecutions here as well, particularly where a death has resulted.

°

V.

CONCLUSION

The Skilling opinion is widely perceived to have closed the door to
several types of common mail and wire fraud prosecutions. This may not,
however, turn out to be the case in health care. The renewed focus on
kickbacks as evidence of an honest services breach instead may dovetail
nicely with both the Obama Administration's emphasis on criminal health
care fraud enforcement and the jurisprudence of the AKS itself. In the
current "law enforcement" climate for healthcare fraud, this kind of
leverage may prove very difficult for prosecutors to resist - and most
certainly will require changes in the way the health law bar approaches
common anti-kickback concerns.

20.
21.

18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343; 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(2011).
18 U.S.C. § 1347 (2011).

